#### ReMoS: Reducing Defect Inheritance in Transfer Learning via <u>Re</u>levant <u>Model Slicing</u>

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### Software Reuse Is a Common Practice

**Original Code** 

• Copy-pasting a piece of code



<pre>1 void more_variab 2 int idx, old 3 4 /* Save the, 5 old_count = 6 old_var = v; 7 8 /* Incremen 9 v_count += ! 10 variables =</pre>	<pre>bles(){ { _count, old_var[]; old values. */ 1 void more_funct 2 int idx, ol 3 4 /* Save the </pre>	<pre>Pasted Code :ions(){ .d_count, old_f[]; e old values. */</pre>				
<pre>10 Variables = 11 12 /* Copy the 13 for (idx=3; 14 variable 15 16 /* Initiali. 17 for (; idx - 18 variable 19 }</pre>	<pre>5 old_count = 6 old_f = fun 7 8 /* Incremen 9 f_count += 10 functions = 11 12 /* Copy the 13 for (idx=3; 14 function 15</pre>	<pre>1 void more_arrays(){ 2 int idx, old_count, old_array[]; 3 4 /* Save the old values. */ 5 old_count = a_count; 6 old_ary = arrays; 7 8 /* Increment by a fixed amount. */ 9 a_count += STORE_INCR; 10 arrays = pew int[100];</pre>				
	16 /* Initiali 17 for (; idx 18 functio 19 }	<pre>10 arrays = new int[100]; 11 12 /* Copy the old variables. */ 13 for (idx=3; idx<old_count; idx++)<br="">14 arrays[idx] = old_ary[idx]; 15</old_count;></pre>				
baste clone-awarer	ness." ICPC 2010	<pre>15 16 /* Initialize the new element. */ 17 for (; idx &lt; a_count; idx++) 18 arrays[idx] = 0; 19 }</pre>				

• Jablonski et al "Aiding software maintenance with copy-and-paste clone-awareness." ICPC 2010

#### Software Reuse Is a Common Practice

• Third-party library



#### Software Reuse Is a Common Practice

#### Class Inheritance



1	<pre>class Shape(object):</pre>
2	# Constructor
3	<pre>definit(self, size)</pre>
4	<pre>self.size = size</pre>
5	
6	<i># To get size</i>
7	<pre>def getSize(self):</pre>
8	return self.size
9	
10	<pre>def getArea(self):</pre>
11	
12	
13	<pre>def getPerimeter(self):</pre>
14	

1	class Tr	<pre>iangle(Shape):</pre>
2	def	<pre>getArea(self):</pre>
3		<i># Heron's Formula</i>
4		<pre>p = self.size[0]+self.size[1]\</pre>
5		+self.size[2]
6		return sqrt(p*(p-self.size[0])\
7		*(p-self.size[1])\
8		<pre>*(p-self.size[2]))</pre>
9		
10	def	<pre>getPerimeter(self):</pre>
11		return self.size[0]\
12		<pre>+self.size[1]+self.size[2]</pre>
13		
14	class Qu	<pre>areilateral(Shape):</pre>
15	def	<pre>getPerimeter(self):</pre>
16		<pre>return self.size[0]+self.size[1]\</pre>
17		+self.size[2]+self.size[3]
18		
19	class Re	ectangle(Quareilateral):
20	def	getArea(self):
21		return self.size[0]*self.size[1]
22		
23	det	getPerimeter(self):
24		return 2*(self.size[0]+self.size[1])

## DNN Model Reuse: Transfer Learning



# DNN Model Reuse: Transfer Learning

- (Pre-trained) Teacher Model
  - Trained by large-scale dataset, to complete complex task
  - Published on the Internet to be downloaded
- Student Model
  - Fine-tuned on small-scale private dataset, to complete simple task
- Advantage of transfer learning
  - High performance
  - Fast convergence and less training time
  - Less task-specific data



### Software Reuse Inherits Defects

- The famous HeartBleed bug  $\sum$ 
  - A serious vulnerability in the popular OpenSSL cryptographic library.





# **Transfer Learning Inherits Defects**



## DNN defects

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• Backdoor





#### **TL Defect: Causative Defect**



## **Transfer Learning Inherits Defects**

• Model reuse VS. software reuse



# **Transfer Learning Inherits Defects**

• Potential defects in the prior literature that may inherit during model reuse

Task	Γ	Defect Type	Inheritance Rate			
	Adversarial	Penultimate-Layer Guided [58]	58.01%			
CV 🖍	Vulnerability <b>U</b>	Neuron-Coverage Guided [21, 55]	52.58%			
	Backdoor •]	Latent Data Poison [70]	72.91%			
	Adversarial	Greedy Word Swap [31]	64.86%			
	Vulnerability	Word Importance Ranking [29]	94.73%			
	Dealtdoon	Data Poison [20]	96.72%			
	Dackdoor	Weight Poison [32]	97.85%			

### **Cause of Defect Inheritance**

• The student model has similar decision boundary as the teacher model. Perfect Decision Boundary





Teacher

Student

#### Defender's Goal



**Transfer Learning** 

Transfer Learning with ReMoS

# ReMoS: <u>Re</u>levant <u>Mo</u>del <u>Slicing</u>

- Relevant Slicing for Traditional Programs
  - Given a program *P* and a slicing criterion (a test case t and a target statement *s*), relevant slicing is to compute a subset of program statements that influence or **have the potential to** influence the statement *s* during the execution of *t*.

# ReMoS: <u>Re</u>levant <u>Mo</u>del <u>Slicing</u>

- Relevant Slicing for Traditional Programs
  - Given a program P and a slicing criterion (a test case t and a target stateme stateme 1 read(a, b)
     2 int x=0, y=0
     3 x = a + 1
     1 read(a, b)
     2 int x=0, y=0
     3 x = a + 1

```
4 y = b + 1
                             5 int w = 0
5 \text{ int } w = 0
6 \text{ if } x > 3 \text{ then}
                                6 \text{ if } x > 3 \text{ then}
   if y > -3 then
                                 8
            w = w / b
                               10 endif
   Input domain of the
                               11 if y > 5 then
downstream application
                                  w = w + 1
          a < 1
                               13 endif
                               14 write(w)
I WI LCC( W )
              Criterion < \{a = 0, b = 4\}, 14, w >
```

# ReMoS: <u>Re</u>levant <u>Model Slicing</u>

#### • Relevant Slicing for DNN Models

Given a DNN model M and a target domain dataset *D*, relevant model slicing is to compute a subset of model weights that are <u>more</u> <u>relevant</u> (bounded by a threshold) to the inference of samples in *D* and <u>less relevant</u> to the samples outside *D*.



# ReMoS: <u>Re</u>levant <u>Model Slicing</u>



- Evaluation goals
  - Defect mitigation effectiveness
  - Generalizability
  - Efficiency
  - Interpretability
- Experiment setting
  - Four DNN models: two CV models and two NLP models
  - Seven DNN defects: adversarial vulnerability and backdoor
  - Eight datasets

- Defect simulation
  - Penultimate-layer guided adversarial vulnerability
    - Tailored for transfer learning [58]
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  - Backdoor
    - Data poisoning and weight poisoning









- Defect mitigation for Neuron-coverage guided adversarial vulnerability
  - ReMoS eliminates averagely 63% of the inherited defects



Figure 6: The inheritance rate of adversarial inputs generated by different neuron-coverage-guided test generators on ResNet18.

#### • Defect mitigation for NLP backdoor

• ReMoS eliminate 50% data poisoning and 61% weight poisoning defects

Table 2: The defect reduction effectiveness of ReMoS against two backdoor attacks on NLP tasks. For each model, we include four situations where the attacker's dataset may be the same or different as the student dataset.

		Dataset		Data Poisoning						Weight Poisoning					
Model				Fine-tune		Mag-prune		ReMoS		Fine-tune		Mag-prune		ReMoS	
			ACC	DIR	ACC	DIR	ACC	DIR	ACC	DIR	ACC	DIR	ACC	DIR	
BERT	FDV	SST-2 to SST-2	92.70	100.00	92.35	100.00	91.27	39.09	92.29	100.00	92.44	100.00	90.92	29.82	
	FDK	IMDB to IMDB	87.96	96.11	88.24	96.15	85.53	61.73	89.34	96.15	89.48	96.09	87.00	37.72	
	DS	SST-2 to IMDB	90.53	100.00	91.26	100.00	90.04	74.67	91.67	100.00	91.16	100.00	87.42	61.48	
	03	IMDB to SST-2	93.21	96.17	92.46	96.17	91.15	27.71	92.80	96.22	92.58	96.02	91.94	21.55	
RoBERTa	FDK	SST-2 to SST-2	94.19	100.00	93.70	100.00	91.17	29.82	93.37	100.00	93.19	98.93	90.70	24.94	
		IMDB to IMDB	90.60	93.52	89.54	95.24	85.74	70.19	89.05	96.53	88.76	92.05	86.34	85.91	
	DS	SST-2 to IMDB	92.11	99.88	92.27	100.00	90.32	24.14	91.85	100.00	90.82	99.53	88.71	30.83	
		IMDB to SST-2	93.52	88.15	92.65	85.26	92.17	61.26	93.85	93.93	93.57	91.21	89.95	18.07	
Average Relative Value		-	-	0.99	0.99	0.97	0.50	-	-	0.99	0.98	0.97	0.39		

# Conclusion

- DNN model reuse (transfer learning), like traditional software reuse, faces defect inheritance problem
- Two possible types of inheritable defects are adversarial vulnerability and DNN backdoor
- The defect inheritance problem can be mitigated by only reuse the relevant model slice instead of the whole DNN model
- The proposed approach, ReMoS (Relevant Model Slicing), can mitigate over 60% of the CV inherited defects and 40% of the NLP inherited defects